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Abstract
We introduce here a family of mixed coalitional values. They extend the binomial semi-
values to games endowed with a coalition structure, satisfy the property of symmetry in
the quotient game and the quotient game property, generalize the symmetric coalitional
Banzhaf value introduced by Alonso and Fiestras and link and merge the Shapley value
and the binomial semivalues. A computational procedure in terms of the multilinear ex-
tension of the original game is also provided and an application to political science is
sketched.
Keywords: cooperative game, binomial semivalue, coalition structure, multilinear exten-
sion.
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1 Introduction
The parallel axiomatic characterization stated by Feltkamp [28] shows that the only difference
between the Shapley value (Shapley [50]) and the Banzhaf value (Owen [40]), as allocation
rules for all cooperative games, is that the former satisfies efficiency whereas the latter satis-
fies the total power property. Differences of this kind become important when one is facing
a group decision and negotiation problem and wishes to choose a suitable allocation rule for
solving the problem. The properties of a value should always be a main argument for either
selecting it or rejecting it in each particular case.
In the framework of cooperative games with a coalition structure, other essential differ-
ences also arise between the Owen value (Owen [41]) and the modified Banzhaf value or
Owen–Banzhaf value (Owen [43]). The Owen–Banzhaf value fails to satisfy the property of
symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game property, which are satisfied by the
Owen value.
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Alonso and Fiestras [4] suggested a modification of the Owen–Banzhaf value that satisfies
these two properties and can therefore be compared with the Owen value in terms analogous
to Feltkamp [28]. Our aim here is to introduce the notion of coalitional binomial semivalue as
a wide generalization of the Alonso–Fiestras value (essentially: p ∈ [0,1] instead of p = 1/2)
in order to get the family of symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues that still satisfy the
property of symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game property, so that they differ
from the Owen value just in satisfying a total power property instead of efficiency. These new
values are especially suited for the study of cooperative games where the players show some
(common) tendency as to the size of the coalitions they would agree to form. This tendency
is defined by parameter p. Let us include a motivating example.
Example 1.1 In Section 5 we apply this family of values to the analysis of an interesting
political problem: the Catalonia Parliament during Legislature 2003–2007, prematurely fin-
ished in 2006. Curiously, the analysis remains still valid for Legislature 2006–2010 since, in
spite of the modification of the seat distribution issued from the elections held in November
1, 2006, the strategic possibilities are exactly the same.
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Fig. 1. Political positions in the Catalonia Parliament 2003–2007
In Catalonia, politics is based on two main axes: the classical left–to–right axis and a
crossed one going from Spanish centralism to Catalanism (Catalan nationalism) (see Fig. 1).
Thus, in 2003 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a radical nationalist and left–wing
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party, was faced to the dilemma of choosing among either a Catalanist majority coalition with
Converge`ncia i Unio´ (CiU) or a left–wing majority coalition with the Partit dels Socialistes
de Catalunya (PSC) and Iniciativa per Catalunya–Verds (ICV), which was finally formed in
2003 and has been repeated in 2006.
A classical approach to study the problem would consist in using either (a) the Shapley
value and the Owen value or, alternatively, (b) the Banzhaf value and the Owen–Banzhaf
value, in order to evaluate the strategic possibilities of each party in both setups. The results
are given in Table 1, where (NO) means no coalition formation, (C) means that CiU + ERC
forms, and (LW) means that PSC + ERC + ICV forms.
Table 1. Classical measures of power in the Catalonia Parliament 2003–2007
(a) (b)
(NO) (C) (LW) (NO) (C) (LW)
CiU 0.4000 0.5000 0.0000 0.6250 0.5000 0.0000
PSC 0.2333 0.0000 0.3889 0.3750 0.0000 0.3750
ERC 0.2333 0.5000 0.3889 0.3750 0.5000 0.3750
PPC 0.0667 0.0000 0.0000 0.1250 0.0000 0.0000
ICV 0.0667 0.0000 0.2222 0.1250 0.0000 0.1250
According to the Shapley and Owen values used in (a), ERC would strictly prefer joining
CiU instead of PSC and ICV. The same conclusion is obtained according to the Banzhaf and
Owen–Banzhaf values used in (b). In both cases, the results fail to provide a mathematical
explanation of ERC’s actual decision (to join PSC and ICV).
Instead, by using binomial semivalues, and symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues
whenever a coalition structure exists, the conclusion of the theoretical analysis is that ERC,
the crucial agent in this scenario, was not necessarily forced to participate in the left–wing
tripartite government but would have got more political power in joining CiU depending on
the tendency of the parties. The reader is referred to Example 5.3 for a detailed analysis.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a minimum of preliminaries
is provided. Section 3 is devoted to define and study the symmetric coalitional binomial
semivalue, and it includes an axiomatic characterization that parallels Owen [41] for the
Owen value. In Section 4 we present a computation procedure for the symmetric coalitional
binomial semivalue. Section 5 contains a remark on simple games and two detailed examples
and, finally, we have included in Section 6 a historical note.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Games and semivalues
Let N be a finite set of players and 2N be the set of its coalitions (subsets of N). A cooperative
game on N is a function v : 2N →R, that assigns a real number v(S) to each coalition S ⊆ N,
with v( /0) = 0. A game v is monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N. A player i ∈ N
is a dummy in v if v(S∪{i}) = v(S)+ v({i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, and null in v if, moreover,
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v({i}) = 0. Two players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in v if v(S∪ {i}) = v(S∪{ j}) for all S ⊆
N\{i, j}.
Endowed with the natural operations for real–valued functions, i.e. v + v′ and λv for all
λ ∈ R, the set of all cooperative games on N is a vector space GN . For every nonempty
coalition T ⊆ N, the unanimity game uT is defined by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) = 0
otherwise, and it is easily checked that the set of all unanimity games is a basis for GN .
Finally, every permutation θ of N induces a linear automorphism of GN given by (θv)(S) =
v(θ−1S) for all S ⊆ N and all v.
By a value on GN we will mean a map f : GN →RN , that assigns to every game v a vector
f [v] with components fi[v] for all i ∈ N.
Following Weber’s [58] axiomatic description, ψ : GN →RN is a semivalue iff it satisfies
the following properties:
(i) linearity: ψ[v + v′] = ψ[v]+ ψ[v′] (additivity) and ψ[λv] = λψ[v] for all v,v′ ∈ GN and
λ ∈ R;
(ii) anonymity: ψθi[θv] = ψi[v] for all θ on N, i ∈ N, and v ∈ GN ;
(iii) positivity: if v is monotonic, then ψ[v]≥ 0;
(iv) dummy player property: if i ∈ N is a dummy in game v, then ψi[v] = v({i}).
There is an interesting characterization of semivalues, by means of weighting coefficients,
due to Dubey, Neyman and Weber [26]. Set n = |N|. Then: (a) for every weighting vector
{pk}n−1k=0 such that
n−1
∑
k=0
pk
(
n−1
k
)
= 1 and pk ≥ 0 for all k, the expression
ψi[v] = ∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps[v(S∪{i})− v(S)] for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN ,
where s = |S|, defines a semivalue ψ; (b) conversely, every semivalue can be obtained in this
way; (c) the correspondence given by {pk}n−1k=0 7→ ψ is bijective.
Thus, the payoff that a semivalue allocates to every player in any game is a weighted sum
of his marginal contributions in the game. If pk is interpreted as the probability that a given
player i joins a coalition of size k, provided that all the coalitions of a common size have
the same probability of being joined, then ψi[v] is the expected marginal contribution of that
player to a random coalition he joins.
Well known examples of semivalues are the Shapley value ϕ (Shapley [50]), for which
pk = 1/n
(
n−1
k
)
, and the Banzhaf value β (Owen [40]), for which pk = 21−n. The Shapley
value ϕ is the only efficient semivalue, in the sense that ∑
i∈N
ϕi[v] = v(N) for every v ∈ GN .
Notice that these values are defined for each N. The same happens with the binomial
semivalues, introduced by Puente [48] as follows. Let p ∈ [0,1] and pk = pk(1− p)n−k−1 for
k = 0,1, . . . ,n− 1. Then {pk}n−1k=0 is a weighting vector and defines a semivalue that will be
denoted as ψp and called the p–binomial semivalue. Using the convention that 00 = 1, the
definition makes sense also for p = 0 and p = 1, where we respectively get the dictatorial
index ψ0 and the marginal index ψ1, introduced by Owen [42] and such that ψ0i [v] = v({i})
and ψ1i [v] = v(N)− v(N\{i}) for all i ∈ N and all v ∈ GN . Of course, p = 1/2 gives ψ1/2 = β
—the Banzhaf value.
In fact, semivalues are defined on cardinalities rather than on specific player sets: this
means that a weighting vector {pk}n−1k=0 defines a semivalue ψ on all N such that n = |N|.
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When necessary, we shall write ψ(n) for a semivalue on cardinality n and p(n)k for its weighting
coefficients. A semivalue ψ(n) induces semivalues ψ(t) for all cardinalities t < n, recurrently
defined by the Pascal triangle (inverse) formula given by Dragan [23]:
p(t)k = p
(t+1)
k + p
(t+1)
k+1 for 0 ≤ k < t.
A series ψ = {ψ(n)}∞n=1 of semivalues, one for each cardinality, is a multisemivalue if it
satisfies Dragan’s recurrence formula. Thus, the Shapley and Banzhaf values and all binomial
semivalues are multisemivalues.
2.2 Games with coalition structure
Let us consider a finite set, say, N = {1,2, . . . ,n}. We will denote by P(N) the set of all
partitions of N. Each P ∈ P(N) is called a coalition structure or system of unions on N. The
so–called trivial coalition structures are Pn = {{1},{2}, . . . ,{n}} (individual coalitions) and
PN = {N} (grand coalition). A cooperative game with a coalition structure is a pair [v;P],
where v ∈ GN and P ∈ P(N) for a given N. Each partition P gives a pattern of cooperation
among players. We denote by GcsN the set of all cooperative games with a coalition structure
and player set N.
If [v;P] ∈ GcsN and P = {P1,P2, . . . ,Pm}, the quotient game vP is the cooperative game
played by the unions, or, rather, by the set M = {1,2, . . . ,m} of their representatives, as
follows:
vP(R) = v(
⋃
r∈R
Pr) for all R ⊆ M.
Unions Pr,Ps are said to be symmetric in [v;P] if r,s are symmetric players in vP.
By a coalitional value on GcsN we will mean a map g : GcsN → RN , which assigns to every
pair [v;P] a vector g[v;P] with components gi[v;P] for each i ∈ N.
The Owen value (Owen [41]) is the coalitional value Φ defined by
Φi[v;P] = ∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
1
mpk
1(
m−1
r
) 1(pk−1
t
) [v(Q∪T ∪{i})− v(Q∪T)]
for all i ∈ N and [v;P] ∈ GcsN , where Pk ∈ P is the union such that i ∈ Pk and Q =
⋃
r∈R
Pr. It
was axiomatically characterized by Owen [41] as the only coalitional value that satisfies the
following properties: the natural extensions to this framework of
• efficiency
• additivity
• the dummy player property
and also
• symmetry within unions: if i, j ∈ Pk are symmetric in v then
Φi[v;P] = Φ j[v;P]
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• symmetry in the quotient game: if Pr,Ps ∈ P are symmetric in [v;P] then
∑
i∈Pr
Φi[v;P] = ∑
j∈Ps
Φ j[v;P].
The Owen value is a coalitional value of the Shapley value ϕ in the sense that Φ[v;Pn] =
ϕ[v] for all v∈GN . Besides, Φ[v;PN ] = ϕ[v]. Finally, as Φ is defined for any N, the following
property makes sense and is also satisfied:
• quotient game property: for all [v;P] ∈ GcsN ,
∑
i∈Pk
Φi[v;P] = Φk[vP;Pm] for all Pk ∈ P.
The Owen value can be viewed as a two–step allocation rule. First, each union Pk receives
its payoff in the quotient game according to the Shapley value; then, each Pk splits this amount
among its players by applying the Shapley value to a game played in Pk as follows: the worth
of each subcoalition T of Pk is the Shapley value that T would get in a “pseudoquotient
game” played by T and the remaining unions on the assumption that Pk\T leaves the game,
i.e. the quotient game after replacing Pk with T . This is the way to bargain within the union:
each subcoalition T claims the payoff it would obtain when dealing with the other unions in
absence of its partners in Pk.
The Owen–Banzhaf value B (Owen [43]) follows a similar scheme. The resulting formula
parallels that of the Owen value with the sole change of coefficient 1/mpk
(
m−1
r
)(pk−1
t
)
by
21−m21−pk . This value, which is a coalitional value of the Banzhaf value β, does not satisfy
efficiency, but neither symmetry in the quotient game nor the quotient game property. The
bargaining interpretation is the same as in the case of the Owen value by replacing everywhere
the Shapley value with the Banzhaf value.
Alonso and Fiestras [4] introduced a modification of the Owen–Banzhaf value. In this
case, the coefficient of each marginal contribution is replaced with 21−m/pk
(pk−1
t
)
. This
symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value Π satisfies the same properties as the Owen value, with
the sole exception of efficiency —replaced by a total power property—, as well as the quotient
game property, and it is a coalitional value of the Banzhaf value.
Example 2.1 (Alonso and Fiestras [4]) Let us take n = 5 and consider the unanimity game
uN and the coalition structure P = {P1,P2} where P1 = {1,2,3} and P2 = {4,5}. Notice that
the quotient game is uPN = uM , where M = {1,2}. It is not difficult to obtain the following
values: β[uN ] = (1/16,1/16,1/16,1/16,1/16),
β[uPN ] = (1/2,1/2),
B[uN ;P] = (1/8,1/8,1/8,1/4,1/4).
As P1 and P2 are symmetric in [uN ;P], it follows that the Owen–Banzhaf value B fails to
satisfy the property of symmetry in the quotient game. Neither the quotient game property is
fulfilled by B in this instance. Instead
Π[uN ;P] = (1/6,1/6,1/6,1/4,1/4)
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so that both properties are satisfied by the Alonso–Fiestras value Π (here and elsewhere).
Since the Banzhaf value β is a particular p–binomial semivalue (p = 1/2), this exam-
ple also shows that the coalitional p–binomial semivalues, which can be obtained from the
work by Albizuri and Zarzuelo [3] or Amer and Gime´nez [8] by applying Owen’s scheme to
any p–binomial semivalue, satisfy, in general, none of both properties. That’s why we will
generalize Alonso and Fiestras’ procedure.
3 The symmetric coalitional binomial semivalue
In this section we define and study a “coalitional version” of each p–binomial semivalue for
games with coalition structure. This includes, besides the explicit formula, an axiomatic char-
acterization and an interpretation in terms of a two–step bargaining process, among unions,
first, and among players within each union later. We begin by dealing with binomial semi-
values. We recall that ψp denotes, for each p ∈ [0,1], the p–binomial semivalue acting on a
fixed GN .
Definition 3.1 Let p ∈ [0,1]. A value f on GN satisfies the p–binomial total power property
if
∑
i∈N
fi[v] = ∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆N\{i}
ps(1− p)n−s−1[v(S∪{i})− v(S)] for all v ∈ GN .
Lemma 3.2 Let /0 6= S ⊆ N, s = |S| and i ∈ N. Then ψpi [uS] = ps−1 if i ∈ S, and ψpi [uS] = 0
otherwise.
Proof: Let i ∈ S. By the definition of the weighting coefficients of ψp we have
ψpi [uS] =
(
n−s
0
)
ps−1(1− p)n−s + (n−s1 )ps(1− p)n−s−1 + · · ·+ (n−sn−s)pn−1 =
= ps−1[(p +(1− p)]n−s = ps−1.
If i /∈ S, the dummy player property yields ψpi [uS] = 0. 
Proposition 3.3 The unique semivalue on GN that satisfies the p–binomial total power prop-
erty is the p–binomial semivalue ψp.
In other words, ∑i∈N ψi[v] = ∑i∈N ψpi [v] for all v ∈ GN implies ψ = ψp.
Proof: (a) It is obvious that the p–binomial semivalue ψp satisfies the p–binomial total power
property.
(b) Using linearity and the fact that the unanimity games form a basis of GN , it suffices to
prove that any semivalue ψ satisfying the p–binomial total power property coincides with ψp
on each unanimity game. Let uS be such a game for some S ⊆ N. From the dummy player
property we get ψi[uS] = 0 = ψpi [uS] for all i /∈ S. From the p–binomial total power property
it follows that ∑
i∈S
ψi[uS] = sps−1. Using anonymity, ψi[uS] = ps−1 for each i ∈ S, and this
allocation coincides with ψpi [uS] according to Lemma 3.2. 
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In particular, setting p = 1/2 we obtain that the Banzhaf value β is the only semivalue
that satisfies the classical total power property:
∑
i∈N
fi[v] = 12n−1 ∑i∈N ∑S⊆N\{i}[v(S∪{i})− v(S)] for all v ∈ GN .
The Owen (resp., Owen–Banzhaf) value is a natural extension of the Shapley (resp.,
Banzhaf) value to games with a coalition structure. We generalize this idea.
Definition 3.4 Given a value f on GN , a coalitional value of f is a coalitional value g on GcsN
such that g[v;Pn] = f [v] for all v ∈ GN .
Let g be a coalitional value of the p–binomial semivalue ψp defined for all N, and assume
that g satisfies the quotient game property. Then, for a given N and any [v;P] ∈ GcsN ,
∑
i∈N
gi[v;P] = ∑
k∈M
∑
i∈Pk
gi[v;P] = ∑
k∈M
gk[vP;Pm] = ∑
k∈M
ψpk [v
P] =
= ∑
k∈M
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1− p)m−r−1[vP(R∪{k})− vP(R)].
This motivates the next definition, that is an adaptation of the p–binomial total power property
to games with a coalition structure.
Definition 3.5 Let p∈ [0,1]. A coalitional value g on GcsN satisfies the coalitional p–binomial
total power property if, for all [v;P] ∈ GcsN ,
∑
i∈N
gi[v;P] = ∑
k∈M
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1− p)m−r−1[vP(R∪{k})− vP(R)].
The next statement defines and axiomatically characterizes, for each p ∈ [0,1], the sym-
metric coalitional p–binomial semivalue, which will be denoted as Ωp.
Theorem 3.6 Let p∈ [0,1]. For any N there is a unique coalitional value on GcsN that satisfies
additivity, the dummy player property, symmetry within unions, symmetry in the quotient
game, and the coalitional p–binomial total power property. Given [v;P] ∈ GcsN , this value
allocates to each player i ∈ N the real number
Ωpi [v;P] = ∑
R⊆M\{k}
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
pr(1− p)m−r−1 1
pk
(pk−1
t
) [v(Q∪T ∪{i})− v(Q∪T)],
where Pk ∈ P is the union such that i ∈ Pk and Q =
⋃
r∈R
Pr.
Moreover, Ωp is a coalitional value of the p–binomial semivalue ψp and satisfies the
quotient game property.
Proof: (a) (Existence) It suffices to show that the coalitional value Ωp given by the above
formula satisfies the five properties enumerated in the statement.
1. Additivity. It merely follows from the expression of Ωpi [v;P].
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2. Dummy player property. Let i ∈ N be a dummy player in game v and P be any
coalition structure. Assume i ∈ Pk. Then v(Q∪T ∪{i})− v(Q∪T) = v({i}) for all R and T .
As, moreover,
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1− p)m−r−1 = 1 and ∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
1
pk
(pk−1
t
) = 1,
we conclude that Ωpi [v;P] = v({i}).
3. Symmetry within unions. Let i, j ∈ Pk ∈ P be symmetric players in game v. For each
R ⊆ M\{k} and T ⊆ Pk\{i, j}, let ∆(R,T,h) = v(Q∪T ∪{h})− v(Q∪T) for h = i, j. Then,
by the symmetric position of i, j in v,
f (R,T ) = ∆(R,T, i)−∆(R,T, j) = 0 and
g(R,T ) = ∆(R,T ∪{ j}, i)−∆(R,T ∪{i}, j) = 0,
so that
Ωpi [v;P]−Ωpj [v;P] = ∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1− p)m−r−1 ∑
T⊆Pk\{i, j}
[
f (R,T )
pk
(pk−1
t
) + g(R,T )
pk
(pk−1
t+1
)
]
= 0.
4. Coalitional p–binomial total power property. Let [v;P] ∈ GcsN . Fixing k ∈ M, for every
R ⊆ M\{k} we consider the game vR ∈ GPk defined by
vR(T ) = v(Q∪T )− v(Q) for all T ⊆ Pk.
The Shapley value gives, for each i ∈ Pk,
ϕi[vR] = ∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
1
pk
(pk−1
t
) [v(Q∪T ∪{i})− v(Q∪T)].
Using the efficiency of ϕ, we get
∑
i∈Pk
ϕi[vR] = vR(Pk) = v(Q∪Pk)− v(Q) = vP(R∪{k})− vP(R).
Hence
∑
i∈Pk
Ωpi [v;P] = ∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1− p)m−r−1[vP(R∪{k})− vP(R)] = (ψp)(m)k [vP]
and, finally,
∑
i∈N
Ωpi [v;P] = ∑
k∈M
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1− p)m−r−1[vP(R∪{k})− vP(R)].
5. Symmetry in the quotient game. It readily follows from the relationship
∑
i∈Pk
Ωpi [v;P] = (ψp)
(m)
k [v
P],
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stated in the previous point, and the anonymity (whence symmetry) of the p–binomial semi-
value ψp.
(b) (Uniqueness) Let g be a coalitional value on GcsN satisfying the five properties. Using
additivity and the fact that the unanimity games form a basis of GN , it suffices to show that g is
completely determined by its action on any pair of the form [λuS;P], where λ∈R, /0 6= S⊆N
and P ∈ P(N).
By the dummy player property, gi[λuS;P] = 0 if i /∈ S. This leaves us with players i ∈ S.
Let S′ = {k ∈ M : S∩Pk 6= /0} and, for every k ∈ S′, S′k = S∩Pk. It is easy to see that
(λuS)P = λuS′ . From the coalitional p–binomial total power property, and applying Lemma
3.2, we have
∑
i∈N
gi[λuS;P] = ∑
k∈M
(ψp)(m)k [λuS′ ] = ∑
k∈S′
(ψp)(m)k [λuS′ ] = λs′ps
′−1.
Now, from symmetry in the quotient game, if k ∈ S′ then
∑
i∈S′k
gi[λuS;P] = ∑
i∈Pk
gi[λuS;P] = λps
′−1
and, finally, using symmetry within unions,
gi[λuS;P] =
λps′−1
s′k
for any i ∈ S′k.
As S =
⋃
k∈S′ S′k, this concludes the proof that g is univocally determined.
(c) Ωp is a coalitional value of the p–binomial semivalue ψp. Indeed, for P = Pn the
explicit formula of Ωp reduces to
Ωpi [v;P
n] = ∑
R⊆N\{i}
pr(1− p)m−r−1[v(R∪{i})− v(R)] = ψpi [v].
Finally, the quotient game property: as we have seen when showing the symmetry in the
quotient game in part (a) of this proof, and using the preceding property for GcsM ,
∑
i∈Pk
Ωpi [v;P] = (ψp)
(m)
k [v
P] = Ωpk [v
P;Pm]. 
Remark 3.7 (a) The symmetric coalitional p–binomial semivalue is a natural (and wide)
generalization of Alonso and Fiestras’ symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value, since Ω1/2 = Π.
(b) Ωp relates not only to the p–binomial semivalue ψp (of which it is a coalitional value)
but also to the Shapley value ϕ, as
Ωp[v;PN ] = ϕ[v] for any v ∈ GN .
Thus, in some manner, Ωp establishes a “coalitional path” that links ϕ and ψp.
(c) From Theorem 3.6 it follows that the only axiomatic difference between the Owen
value Φ and the symmetric coalitional p–binomial semivalue Ωp is that the former satisfies
efficiency whereas the latter satisfies the coalitional p–binomial total power property, in a
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way that parallels the distinction between the Shapley value ϕ and the p–binomial semivalue
ψp.
(d) It is worth mentioning that in the parallel axiomatizations of the Owen value and the
symmetric coalitional p–binomial semivalue, additivity might be replaced with linearity, and
the dummy player property with the null player property. We have chosen the first possibility
in each case (additivity and dummy player property).
(e) The symmetric coalitional p–binomial semivalue also merges the Shapley value and
the p–binomial semivalue. It is the result of a two–step bargaining procedure similar to that
of the Owen value. In our case, the unions play the quotient game among themselves and
each one receives the payoff given by the p–binomial semivalue ψp, and then this payoff is
efficiently shared within the union according to the Shapley value ϕ.
4 A computation procedure
The multilinear extension (Owen [39]) of a game v ∈ GN is the real–valued function defined
on RN by
f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) = ∑
S⊆N
∏
i∈S
xi ∏
j/∈S
(1− x j)v(S).
As is well known, both the Shapley and Banzhaf values of any game v can be easily
obtained from its multilinear extension. Indeed, ϕ[v] can be calculated by integrating the
partial derivatives of the multilinear extension of the game along the main diagonal x1 =
x2 = · · ·= xn of the cube [0,1]N (Owen [39]), while the partial derivatives of that multilinear
extension evaluated at point (1/2,1/2, . . . ,1/2) give β[v] (Owen [40]. This latter procedure
extends well to any p–binomial semivalue (see Puente [48], Freixas and Puente [29] or Amer
and Gime´nez [8]) by evaluating the derivatives at point (p, p, . . . , p).
In the context of games with a coalition structure, the multilinear extension technique has
been also applied to computing the Owen value Φ (Owen and Winter [45]), as well as the
Owen–Banzhaf value B (Carreras and Magan˜a [18]) and the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf
value Π (Alonso, Carreras and Fiestras [5]). In this section we present a method to compute
the symmetric coalitional p–binomial semivalue Ωp by means of the multilinear extension of
the game.
Theorem 4.1 Let p ∈ [0,1] and [v;P] ∈ GcsN be a cooperative game with a coalition struc-
ture. Then the following steps lead to the symmetric coalitional p–binomial semivalue of any
player i ∈ Pk in [v;P].
1. Obtain the multilinear extension f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) of game v.
2. For every r 6= k and all h ∈ Pr, replace the variable xh with yr. This yields a new
function of x j for j ∈ Pk and yr for r ∈ M\{k}.
3. In this function, reduce to 1 all higher exponents, i.e. replace with yr each yqr such that
q > 1. This gives a new multilinear function that we denote as g((x j) j∈Pk , (yr)r∈M\{k}).
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4. In the function obtained in step 3, substitute each yr by p. This provides a new function
αk((x j) j∈Pk) defined by
αk((x j) j∈Pk) = g((x j) j∈Pk ,(p)r∈M\{k}).
5. Finally, the symmetric coalitional p–binomial semivalue of player i ∈ Pk in [v;P] is
given by
Ωpi [v;P] =
∫ 1
0
∂αk
∂xi
(z,z, . . . ,z)dz.
Proof: Steps 1–3 have already been used by Owen and Winter [45], Carreras and Magan˜a
[18] and Alonso, Carreras and Fiestras [5] in dealing with the Owen value, the Owen–Banzhaf
value and the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value, respectively. It will be useful to recall
their common argument here.
By the second and third steps, we get a multilinear function where all terms corresponding
to coalitions S such that S∩Pr 6= /0 and (N\S)∩Pr 6= /0 for some r ∈ M\{k} vanish. Indeed,
in step 2, the terms corresponding to these coalitions include expressions like cyq1r (1− yr)q2 ,
with q1,q2 ∈N, and in step 3 these terms turn on c(yr− yr) thus getting zero.
Hence, the only coalitions S for which the corresponding term of the (initial) multilinear
extension may not vanish after steps 2 and 3 are those of the form S = Q∪T , where T ⊆ Pk
and Q = ⋃
r∈R
Pr for some R ⊆ M\{k}. The function arising from step 3 is therefore
g((x j) j∈Pk , (yr)r∈M\{k}) =
∑
T⊆Pk
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∏
j∈T
x j ∏
j∈Pk\T
(1− x j)∏
r∈R
yr ∏
r/∈R∪{k}
(1− yr)v(Q∪T ).
Substituting each yr by p (step 4) gives
αk((x j) j∈Pk) = ∑
T⊆Pk
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∏
j∈T
x j ∏
j∈Pk\T
(1− x j)pr(1− p)m−r−1v(Q∪T ).
By differentiating function αk((x j) j∈Pk) with respect to xi
∂αk
∂xi
((x j) j∈Pk) =
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
∑
R⊆M\{k}
∏
j∈T
x j ∏
j∈Pk\(T∪{i})
(1− x j)pr(1− p)m−r−1[v(Q∪T ∪{i})− v(Q∪T)].
Finally, by step 5, ∫ 1
0
∂αk
∂xi
(z,z, . . . ,z)dz =
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1− p)m−r−1[v(Q∪T ∪{i})− v(Q∪T)]
∫ 1
0
zt(1− z)pk−t−1dz =
∑
T⊆Pk\{i}
∑
R⊆M\{k}
pr(1− p)m−r−1 t!(pk − t−1)!
pk!
[v(Q∪T ∪{i})− v(Q∪T)] = Ωpi [v;P]. 
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5 A remark and two examples
Simple games form an especially interesting class of cooperative games. Not only as a test
bed for many cooperative concepts, but also for the variety of their interpretations, often far
from game theory. In particular, they are frequently applied to describe and analyze collective
decision–making mechanisms —weighted majority games play a crucial role here—, and the
notion of voting power is closely attached to them.
Shapley and Shubik [52] were the first to adapt a cooperative tool —the Shapley value—
to simple games, using it as a measure of power. Shapley [51] stated a series of arguments
inviting to a self–contained treatment of this class of games, and Dubey [24] initiated this
line when providing an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley–Shubik power index as a
solution concept on the class of simple games, for which he introduced the transfer property
in order to replace the useless additivity property.
A cooperative game v on N is simple if it is monotonic and v(S) = 0 or 1 for every S⊆ N.
A coalition S⊆ N is winning in v if v(S) = 1 (otherwise it is called losing), and W (v) denotes
the set of winning coalitions in v. Due to monotonicity, the set W m(v) of all minimal winning
coalitions determines W (v) and hence the game. A simple game v is a weighted majority
game if there are nonnegative weights w1,w2, . . . ,wn allocated to the players and a positive
quota q such that
v(S) = 1 iff ∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q.
We then write v = [q;w1,w2, . . . ,wn]. (For additional details on simple games, we refer the
interested reader to e.g. Carreras and Freixas [14], Taylor and Zwicker [54] or Carreras [12].)
Let SG N denote the set of all simple games on a given player set N. A power index
on SGN is a function f : SGN → RN . All properties stated for values in this paper —with
the sole exception of additivity and linearity— make sense for power indices. As SGN is
a lattice under the standard composition laws given by (v∨ v′)(S) = max{v(S),v′(S)} and
(v∧v′)(S) = min{v(S),v′(S)}, we will say that a power index f satisfies the transfer property
if
f [v∨ v′] = f [v]+ f [v′]− f [v∧ v′] for all v,v′ ∈ SGN .
Carreras, Freixas and Puente [20] gave an axiomatic characterization and a combinatorial
description in terms of weighting coefficients for (the restrictions of) semivalues as power
indices, which parallel the corresponding ones for semivalues on general cooperative games.
Let SG csN be the set of all simple games with a coalition structure on N. A coalitional
power index on SGcsN is a function g : SG
cs
N →RN . All properties stated for coalitional values
in this paper —excluding again additivity and linearity—, as well as the natural extension of
the transfer property, make sense for coalitional power indices. Va´zquez, van den Nouweland
and Garcı´a–Jurado [56] carried out an axiomatic characterization of the (restricted) Owen
value as a coalitional power index by means of efficiency, the transfer property, the dummy
player property, symmetry within unions and symmetry in the quotient game.
In a similar way, we have found a “parallel” axiomatic characterization of the symmetric
coalitional binomial semivalues as power indices (that is, restricted to SGcsN ) that we state
without proof because it is very similar to that of Theorem 3.6.
13
Corollary 5.1 Let p ∈ [0,1]. For any N there is a unique coalitional power index on SGcsN
that satisfies the coalitional p–binomial total power property, the transfer property, the dummy
player property, symmetry within unions and symmetry in the quotient game. It is the restric-
tion of the symmetric coalitional p–binomial semivalue ΩP to SG csN .
Besides, this index satisfies the quotient game property and reduces to the (restricted) p–
binomial semivalue ψp when P = Pn and to the Shapley–Shubik power index ϕ when P = PN .

Example 5.2 Let us consider the 5–person weighted majority game
v = [68;46,42,23,15,9]
and the coalition structure P = {{1,4},{2,5},{3}}. We will compute ψp[v] and Ωp[v;P] for
any p ∈ [0,1].
The set of minimal winning coalitions of the game is
W m(v) = {{1,2},{1,3},{1,4,5},{2,3,4},{2,3,5}}
and the multilinear extension of v is
f (x1,x2,x3,x4,x5) = x1x2 + x1x3− x1x2x3 + x1x4x5 + x2x3x4 + x2x3x5−
− x1x2x3x4− x1x2x3x5− x1x2x4x5− x1x3x4x5− x2x3x4x5 + 2x1x2x3x4x5.
Taking into account that players 2 and 3, on one hand, and players 4 and 5 on the other,
are symmetric in v, the computation method for binomial semivalues stated by Puente [48]
(see also Amer and Gime´nez [8]) gives
ψp1 [v] =
∂ f
∂x1
(p, p, p, p, p) = p(1− p)(2 + 2p−2p2),
ψp3 [v] = ψ
p
2 [v] =
∂ f
∂x2
(p, p, p, p, p) = p(1− p)(1 + 2p−2p2),
ψp5 [v] = ψ
p
4 [v] =
∂ f
∂x4
(p, p, p, p, p) = p(1− p)(2p−2p2).
In order to compute Ωp[v] we use Theorem 4.1. As M = {1,2,3}, steps 1–3 give
g1(x1,x4,y2,y3) = y2y3 + x1(y2 + y3−2y2y3),
g2(y1,x2,x5,y3) = y1y3 + x2(y1− y1y3)+ x5(y1− y1y3)+ x2x5(y3− y1),
g3(y1,y2,x3) = y1y2 + x3(y1 + y2−2y1y2),
and step 4 leads to
α1(x1,x4) = g1(x1,x4, p, p) = p2 + x1(2p−2p2),
α2(x2,x5) = g2(p,x2,x5, p) = p2 + x2(p− p2)+ x5(p− p2),
α3(x3) = g3(p, p,x3) = p2 + x3(2p−2p2).
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Step 5 concludes the procedure and gives
Ωp1 [v;P] =
∫ 1
0
∂α1
∂x1
(z,z)dz = 2p−2p2, Ωp4 [v;P] =
∫ 1
0
∂α1
∂x4
(z,z)dz = 0,
Ωp2 [v;P] =
∫ 1
0
∂α2
∂x2
(z,z)dz = p− p2, Ωp5 [v;P] =
∫ 1
0
∂α2
∂x5
(z,z)dz = p− p2,
Ωp3 [v;P] =
∫ 1
0
∂α3
∂x3
(z)dz = 2p−2p2.
Thus
Ωp[v;P] = (2p−2p2, p− p2,2p−2p2,0, p− p2).
In the following example, we shall apply some values and coalitional values (mainly ψp
and Ωp) to the analysis of an interesting political structure: the Catalonia Parliament 2003–
2007. All values have been computed using the multilinear extension technique, as illustrated
in the preceding example.
In the papers by Straffin [53], Laruelle [34] and Laruelle and Valenciano [35], the Banzhaf
value β is suggested as a power measure more suitable than the Shapley value. The natural
generalization to semivalues has been argued by Laruelle and Valenciano [36], Carreras and
Freixas [17], and Carreras, Freixas and Puente [20]. By considering here binomial semi-
values, we look at the Banzhaf value in perspective, as will be shown by the results of our
analysis.
Therefore, our study of alliances will be based on the bargaining process corresponding
to the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues Ωp: first, a power notion is shared among
unions in the quotient game by means of the Banzhaf value or a binomial semivalue; then,
the power so got by each union is shared among its members by using the Shapley value.
This will reflect that both bargaining steps are of different nature. Indeed, notice that, once
an alliance is formed —and, especially, if it supports a coalition government—, cabinet min-
istries, parliamentary and institutional positions, budgets, and other political responsibilities
have to be distributed efficiently among the parties of the coalition, hence in a way as closely
as possible to the one suggested by the Shapley value. At this point, the quotient game prop-
erty and symmetry in the quotient game become very relevant properties. In fact, they are
connected because if a coalitional value satisfies the quotient game property (as is the case
for all Ωp) and it is a coalitional value of the Banzhaf value (or a p–binomial semivalue) then
symmetry in the quotient game follows from the anonymity of β (or of ψp).
Which is the reason for letting p range from 0 to 1? Notice that a reasonable regularity
assumption on players’ behavior is that the probability to form coalitions follows a monotonic
(increasing or decreasing) behavior. Then, it is not difficult to see that the only semivalues
such that pk+1 = λpk for all k (maybe the simplest form of monotonicity) are precisely the
p–binomial semivalues, in which case λ = p1−p for any p ∈ [0,1]. For example, p = 0.1
means that the players are very reticent to form coalitions, whereas p = 0.8 means that great
coalitions are likelier. The neutral case p = 0.5 corresponds to the Banzhaf value. Table 2
shows, for n = 5, the weighting coefficients of ψp for several values of p.
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Table 2. Weighting coefficients of some p–binomial semivalues ψp for n = 5
p = 0.1 p = 0.4 p = 0.5 p = 0.8
(Banzhaf)
p0 = (1− p)4 0.6561 0.1296 0.0625 0.0016
p1 = p(1− p)3 0.0729 0.0864 0.0625 0.0064
p2 = p2(1− p)2 0.0081 0.0576 0.0625 0.0256
p3 = p3(1− p) 0.0009 0.0384 0.0625 0.1024
p4 = p4 0.0001 0.0256 0.0625 0.4096
As we will see, almost all allocations ψpi [v] and coalitional allocations Ω
p
i [v;P] will show
factors p(1− p); the sole exceptions are the cases where i is a dictator or veto player (if we
were dealing with improper games, we should add winner players to this short list). Further-
more, the maximum or the minimum of all these allocations for each player will be attained
in case p = 0.5, that respectively correspond to the Banzhaf value β = ψ1/2 or to the Alonso–
Fiestras coalitional value Π = Ω1/2. These properties would not have been discovered if only
the case p = 0.5 were considered.
Example 5.3 (The Catalonia Parliament, Legislature 2003–2007) Five parties elected mem-
bers to the Catalonia Parliament (135 seats) in the elections held on November 16, 2003,
giving rise to a seat distribution that can be represented by the weighted majority game
v = [68;46,42,23,15,9].
Let us briefly describe ideologically the agents in this game:
1: CiU (Converge`ncia i Unio´), Catalan nationalist middle–of–the–road coalition of two
federated parties.
2: PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya), moderate left–wing socialist party, federated
to the Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol.
3: ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), radical Catalan nationalist left–wing party.
4: PPC (Partit Popular de Catalunya), conservative party, Catalan delegation of the Partido
Popular.
5: ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya–Verds), coalition of Catalan eurocommunist parties, fed-
erated to Izquierda Unida, and ecologist groups (“Verds”).
Notice that, as pointed out in Example 5.2,
W m(v) = {{1,2},{1,3},{1,4,5},{2,3,4},{2,3,5}},
so that players 2 and 3 on one hand, and 4 and 5 on the other, are symmetric in v.
We show in Table 3 the evaluation of v given by several binomial semivalues ψp. The
total power is τp[v] = ∑
i∈N
ψpi [v].
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Table 3. Initial power distribution in the Catalonia Parliament 2003–2007
ψpi [v] p = 0.1 p = 0.4 p = 0.5 p = 0.8
1. CiU p(1− p)(2+2p−2p2) 0.1962 0.5952 0.6250 0.3712
2. PSC p(1− p)(1+2p−2p2) 0.1062 0.3552 0.3750 0.2112
3. ERC p(1− p)(1+2p−2p2) 0.1062 0.3552 0.3750 0.2112
4. PPC p(1− p)(2p−2p2) 0.0162 0.1152 0.1250 0.0512
5. ICV p(1− p)(2p−2p2) 0.0162 0.1152 0.1250 0.0512
τp[v] p(1− p)(4+10p−10p2 ) 0.4410 1.5360 1.6250 0.8960
It is easy to see that the allocations found for p and 1− p would coincide because the
game is decisive (proper and strong). Notice that the proportions between the allocations to
the players decrease as p approaches 0.5 from any of the extreme possibilities (0 or 1). Also
notice that the maximum allocation (power) for any player and the maximum total power are
got for p = 0.5 (Banzhaf value).
Next we are interested in the study and comparison of several coalition structures. In each
case, we have computed the coalitional value Ωp for all p ∈ [0,1] and also Π (for p = 1/2)
and the coalitional p–binomial total power T p[v;P] = ∑
i∈N
Ωpi [v;P]. The cases and results are
as follows:
• The left–wing alliance PSC+ICV, as a previous step. The corresponding coalition struc-
ture is P = {{2,5},{1},{3},{4}}, and the coalitional values are:
Π[v;P] = (1/2,3/8,1/2,0,1/8),
Ωp[v;P] = (2p−2p2,1.5p−1.5p2,2p−2p2,0,0.5p−0.5p2),
T p[v;P] = 6p(1− p).
• The simultaneous alliances CiU+PPC and PSC+ICV, as an alternative previous step.
The corresponding coalition structure is P = {{1,4},{2,5},{3}}, and the coalitional
values are:
Π[v;P] = (1/2,1/4,1/2,0,1/4),
Ωp[v;P] = (2p−2p2, p− p2,2p−2p2,0, p− p2),
T p[v;P] = 6p(1− p).
• The left–wing majority alliance PSC+ERC+ICV. The corresponding coalition structure
is P = {{2,3,5},{1},{4}}, and the coalitional values are:
Π[v;P] = (0,5/12,5/12,0,2/12),
Ωp[v;P] =
(
0, 1 + p− p
2
3 ,
1 + p− p2
3 ,0,
1−2p + 2p2
3
)
,
T p[v;P] = 1.
Notice that Ωpi [v;P] > ψ
p
i [v] for all p ∈ [0,1] and i = 2,3,5, and also that p = 0.5 gives
the maximum of Ωp[v;P] for PSC and ERC but, at the same time, the minimum of
Ωp[v;P] for ICV.
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Incidentally, in this case B[v;P] = (0,3/8,3/8,0,1/8), so that B fails to satisfy the quo-
tient game property and the sharing of the dictatorial power is by no means convincing
because of its inefficiency.
• The catalanist majority alliance CiU+ERC. The corresponding coalition structure is
P = {{1,3},{2},{4},{5}}, and the coalitional values are:
Π[v;P] = (5/8,0,3/8,0,0),
Ωp[v;P] =
(
1 + p− p2
2
,0, 1− p + p
2
2
,0,0
)
,
T p[v;P] = 1.
In this case Πi[v;P] = βi[v] but Ωpi [v;P] > ψpi [v] for all p ∈ [0,1] and i = 1,3 (unless
p = 0.5, where the equality holds). Here p = 0.5 gives the maximum of Ωp[v;P] for
CiU and the minimum for ERC.
A most convenient way to analyze this set of evaluations of the coalitional behavior will
consist in considering different values of p, and we will take 0.1, 0.4, 0.5 (this gives Π)
and 0.8. Tables 4–7 show all these particular allocations but we prefer the following order:
p = 0.5, p = 0.4, p = 0.8 and p = 0.1.
Table 4. Evaluation according to ψp and Ωp for p = 0.5
scenario value CiU PSC ERC PPC ICV
initial (no alliance) β 0.6250 0.3750 0.3750 0.1250 0.1250
PSC+ICV B = Π 0.5000 0.3750 0.5000 0 0.1250
PSC+ICV and CiU+PPC B = Π 0.5000 0.2500 0.5000 0 0.2500
PSC+ERC+ICV B 0 0.3750 0.3750 0 0.1250
PSC+ERC+ICV Π 0 0.4167 0.4167 0 0.1667
CiU+ERC B = Π 0.6250 0 0.3750 0 0
In Table 4, we find that precoalition PSC+ICV does not increase the power of their mem-
bers, but it damages the strategic position of CiU and enhances the strategic possibilities of
ERC. The alternative (simultaneous precoalitions PSC+ICV and CiU+PPC) does not make
better off CiU and PPC but, instead, damages PSC, increases the power of ICV and gives
the same position to ERC. Of course, PPC loses its small power even in joining CiU (its
only natural partner in this situation) because once PSC+ICV is formed PPC becomes a null
player.
An important point arises when considering the majority formation. According to the
Owen–Banzhaf value B, forming a winning coalition does not change the power of its mem-
bers with regard to the initial distribution, although it serves to reduce the outside parties to
a null position. Instead, from the viewpoint of the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value Π,
coalition PSC+ERC+ICV clearly increases the power of each one of its members, and hence
it suggests to ERC the convenience to choose this coalition (which also satisfies its partners,
PSC and ICV) instead of CiU+ERC.
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Therefore, we have to point out here that after a short period of negotiations, precisely
concerning these two options, alliance PSC+ERC+ICV was actually formed and got the re-
gional government of Catalonia, ending 23 years of CiU governments headed by Jordi Pujol
(under absolute majority of this party or with the parliamentary support of PPC). The actual
sharing of positions gave the presidency of the government to Pasqual Maragall (PSC) but the
presidency of the Parliament and the “Conseller en cap” position (a sort of vice–presidency
of the government) to Ernest Benach and Josep Lluis Carod Rovira (both ERC), respec-
tively. The remaining cabinet positions (“conselleries”) were distributed in the proportion
8:5:2 among the three parties.
Table 5. Evaluation according to ψp and Ωp for p = 0.4
scenario CiU PSC ERC PPC ICV
initial (no alliance) 0.5952 0.3552 0.3552 0.1152 0.1152
PSC+ICV 0.4800 0.3600 0.4800 0 0.1200
PSC+ICV and CiU+PPC 0.4800 0.2400 0.4800 0 0.2400
PSC+ERC+ICV 0 0.4133 0.4133 0 0.1733
CiU+ERC 0.6200 0 0.3800 0 0
We recall that the allocations on this (decisive) game for a given p are the same as for
1− p, so that our comments on Table 5 (p = 0.4) are the same as they would be for p = 0.6,
and the analogue holds for Tables 6 and 7.
By comparing the results given in Table 4 with those of Table 5, where it is assumed
that players are not indifferent to join a coalition of any size but, rather, they prefer not too
big coalitions (as p = 0.4), we notice that forming precoalition PSC+ICV increases a bit the
power of its members. Its effects on the outside parties, as well as those of the alternative
(simultaneous formation of CiU+PPC) are the same as in Table 4.
As to the formation of majorities, here, not only in the case of PSC+ERC+ICV but also
in the case of CiU+ERC, every party entering such a coalition clearly increases its power.
However, from ERC’s viewpoint, coalition PSC+ERC+ICV gives again the best fraction of
coalitional power.
Table 6. Evaluation according to ψp and Ωp for p = 0.8
scenario CiU PSC ERC PPC ICV
initial (no alliance) 0.3712 0.2112 0.2112 0.0512 0.0512
PSC+ICV 0.3200 0.2400 0.3200 0 0.0800
PSC+ICV and CiU+PPC 0.3200 0.1600 0.3200 0 0.1600
PSC+ERC+ICV 0 0.3867 0.3867 0 0.2267
CiU+ERC 0.5800 0 0.4200 0 0
It is worth mentioning that almost all (initial or coalitional) power allocations given in Ta-
ble 6 are lower than in the previous cases. The only exceptions are for ICV in PSC+ERC+ICV
and ERC in CiU+ERC. Nevertheless, the variations undergone by the initial allocations
when the precoalitions form are similar to those found in Table 5. The new feature here
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is that, in these circumstances (p = 0.8), ERC would clearly prefer CiU+ERC instead of
PSC+ERC+ICV.
Table 7. Evaluation according to ψp and Ωp for p = 0.1
scenario CiU PSC ERC PPC ICV
initial (no alliance) 0.1962 0.1062 0.1062 0.0162 0.0162
PSC+ICV 0.1800 0.1350 0.1800 0 0.0450
PSC+ICV and CiU+PPC 0.1800 0.0900 0.1800 0 0.0900
PSC+ERC+ICV 0 0.3633 0.3633 0 0.2733
CiU+ERC 0.5450 0 0.4550 0 0
Finally, Table 7 exhibits the same trends as Table 6 but they are even strengthened. Again,
ERC would prefer CiU+ERC, and notice that the increase of its power in agreeing to form
this coalition would be greater than in the previous case.
It is not difficult to see that ERC would prefer option PSC+ERC+ICV instead of CiU+ERC
if, and only if, p ∈ ( 5−
√
5
10 ,
5+
√
5
10 ), would remain indifferent if p =
5±√5
10 and would prefer
CiU+ERC if p /∈ [ 5−
√
5
10 ,
5+
√
5
10 ].
As a conclusion of our analysis, we find that the evaluation of games and games with
a coalition structure by means of binomial semivalues and symmetric coalitional binomial
semivalues provides a new approach to the study of the coalitional bargaining. Some general
properties sketched only on the basis of this instance should deserve further attention. And,
finally, the extension of the coalitional theory to probabilistic values might be, in the near
future, an interesting research field.
6 A historical note
Shapley [50] (see also Roth [49] and Owen [44]) initiated the value theory for cooperative
games. The Shapley value applies without restrictions and provides, for every game, a sin-
gle payoff vector to the players. The restriction of the value to simple games gives rise to the
Shapley–Shubik [52] power index, that was axiomatized by Dubey [24] introducing the trans-
fer property. As a sort of reaction, Banzhaf [11] proposed a different power index (see also
Coleman [21], and even Penrose [47]), that Owen [40] extended to a dummy–independent
and somehow “normalized” Banzhaf value for all cooperative games. A nice almost com-
mon characterization of the Shapley and Banzhaf values would be given by Feltkamp [28],
and a sound interpretative and comparative analysis has been carried out by Laruelle and Va-
lenciano [35]. See also Owen [42], Dubey and Shapley [25], Lehrer [38], Dragan [22] and
Carreras [13].
Dubey, Neyman and Weber [26] axiomatically introduced the notion of semivalue, that
encompasses both the Shapley and Banzhaf values (see also Weber [57] and Einy [27]). We-
ber [58] gave an alternative characterization for semivalues and introduced the probabilistic
values by dropping anonymity.
Many authors have been working on semivalues. We will refer only to the most re-
lated to the present paper. Carreras and Freixas [15] and [16] introduced regular semivalues.
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Puente [48] devoted much of her Ph.D. thesis to semivalues and introduced binomial semival-
ues as a natural generalization of the Banzhaf value (see also Freixas and Puente [29], where
different ways are provided to evaluate the importance of the components in a given reliability
system based on semivalues and probabilistic values). Laruelle and Valenciano [36] and Car-
reras, Freixas and Puente [20] investigated semivalues as power indices, that is, by restricting
them to simple games. Finally, Carreras and Freixas [17] suggested several applications of
semivalues based on their versatility.
Games with a coalition structure were introduced by Aumann and Dre`ze [10], who ex-
tended the Shapley value to this new framework in such a manner that the game really splits
into subgames played by the unions isolatedly from each other, and every player receives the
payoff allocated by the restriction of the Shapley value to the subgame he is playing within
his union. A second approach was used by Owen [41], when introducing and axiomatically
characterizing his coalitional value (Owen value). In this case, the unions play a quotient
game among themselves, and each one receives a payoff which, in turn, is shared among its
players in an internal game. Both payoffs, in the quotient game for unions and within each
union for its players, are given by applying the Shapley value. Further axiomatizations of the
Owen value have been given by e.g. Hart and Kurz [33], Peleg [46], Winter [59], Amer and
Carreras [6] and [7], Va´zquez, van den Nouweland and Garcı´a–Jurado [56], Va´zquez [55],
Hamiache [31] and [32], Albizuri and Zarzuelo [3] and Albizuri [2].
By applying a similar procedure to the Banzhaf value, Owen [43] got the modified Banzhaf
value or Owen–Banzhaf value for games with a coalition structure. In this case the payoffs at
both levels, that of the unions in the quotient game and that of the players within each union,
are given by the Banzhaf value. This modified value was axiomatically characterized only
recently, by Albizuri [1] and [2] and, independently, by Amer, Carreras and Gime´nez [9].
Interesting interpretations of this value as a power index when restricted to simple games can
be found in Laruelle and Valenciano [37].
The natural generalization of semivalues for games with coalition structure has been car-
ried out by Albizuri and Zarzuelo [3]. These authors provide axiomatic characterizations in
both cases: the homogeneous one, when a common semivalue is used by unions in the quo-
tient game and by players within each one of them (see also Gime´nez [30] and Amer and
Gime´nez [8] for this case), and the heterogeneous one, where different semivalues apply in
the quotient game and (uniformly) within all unions.
Alonso and Fiestras [4] realized that the Owen–Banzhaf value fails to satisfy two inter-
esting properties of the Owen value: symmetry in the quotient game and the quotient game
property. Then they suggested to modify the two–step allocation scheme and use the Banzhaf
value for sharing in the quotient game and the Shapley value within unions. This gave rise
to a new, heterogeneous coalitional value that can be compared with the Owen value and
satisfies the above properties.
In fact, heterogeneous coalitional values are a particular case of mixed coalitional values.
Mixed coalitional values were already suggested by Carreras and Magan˜a [19] in a more
general setup (see also Alonso, Carreras and Fiestras [5]). The idea is that unions might
use any value in the quotient game and, then, the players of each union might use a value
different from that of the unions and from those used within other unions. Notice that the
unions are, in general, of a different nature from the original, single players, and even from
each other, and the quotient game may well possess features not found in the initial game.
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The question is not, therefore, “why will the unions follow, as entities, a way different from
players’ one?” but, rather, “why not?” After all, freedom is a human aspiration that we should
take into account in our mathematical modeling of the real life behavior, and the contract for
forming each union could (in fact, it should) perfectly specify the way to share profits among
its members.
Then, a formal notation will help us to better distinguish the several coalitional evaluation
criteria that can arise. Let σ be the semivalue used by unions and ρ1,ρ2, . . . , ρm be the
semivalues respectively used by each union. We denote the compound rule as
σρ1,ρ2, . . . ,ρm.
With this notation, a first level of homogeneity is achieved in case σρ,ρ, . . . ,ρ = σρm for some
common ρ. Thus, Alonso and Fiestras’ [4] symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value is Π = βϕm,
whereas the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalue introduced in this paper is Ωp = ψpϕm,
where ψp is the binomial semivalue defined by number p. A further homogeneity level is
finally found in the case where σ = ρ, like in Owen’s classical extensions: the Owen value is
Φ = ϕϕm and the Owen–Banzhaf value is B = ββm.
Great attention has also been paid to the computation of values, usually in terms of the
multilinear extension (Owen [39]) of the original game. Thus, Owen [39] refers to the Shap-
ley value ϕ, Owen [40] to the Banzhaf value β, and Owen and Winter [45] to the Owen value
Φ. Carreras and Magan˜a [18] have applied the same procedure to the Owen–Banzhaf value
B, and Carreras and Magan˜a [19] have studied the multilinear extension of the quotient game.
More recently, Alonso, Carreras and Fiestras [5] apply the multilinear extension method
to the Alonso–Fiestras value Π, and also to a “counterpart” value M = ϕβm introduced by
Amer, Carreras and Gime´nez [9]. In Puente [48] it is shown that the binomial semivalues
can be computed in a way very close to that of the Banzhaf value. Gime´nez [30] and Amer
and Gime´nez [8] prove that (a) any other semivalue requires using a geometrical reference
system of the semivalue simplex, given by any n different binomial semivalues, and a linear
map whose matrix depends on (the partial derivatives of the multilinear extension of) the
game and the reference system —it also applies, of course, to the Shapley value, with no in-
tegration step—, and (b) the homogeneous coalitional semivalues can be computed by means
of a bilinear form whose matrix depends, again, on the game and the reference system. It
is worthy mentioning here that in the case of coalitional binomial semivalues Carreras and
Magan˜a’s [18] procedure applies as well.
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